While the Gorkhas had been expanding their empire – into Sikkim in the east, Kumaon and Garhwal in the west and into the British sphere of influence in Oudh in the south – the British East India Company had consolidated its position in India from its main bases of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. This British expansion had already been resisted in India, culminating in three Anglo-Maratha wars as well as in the Punjab where Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Empire had their own aspirations. It was therefore imperative to the British that the Gorkha War was quickly and successfully concluded.
When the Kathmandu durbar solicited Gorkha chiefs’ opinions about a possible war with the British, Amar Singh was not alone in his opposition, declaring that – "They will not rest satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the hill rajas, whom we have dispossessed." This contrasts sharply with the prime minister Bhimsen Thapa – " ... our hills and fastness are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable." The Gorkha prime minister realised the Nepalese had several advantages over the British including knowledge of the region and recent experience fighting in the mountainous terrain. However, the British had numerical superiority and far more modern weapons.
When the Kathmandu durbar solicited Gorkha chiefs’ opinions about a possible war with the British, Amar Singh was not alone in his opposition, declaring that – "They will not rest satisfied without establishing their own power and authority, and will unite with the hill rajas, whom we have dispossessed." This contrasts sharply with the prime minister Bhimsen Thapa – " ... our hills and fastness are formed by the hand of God, and are impregnable." The Gorkha prime minister realised the Nepalese had several advantages over the British including knowledge of the region and recent experience fighting in the mountainous terrain. However, the British had numerical superiority and far more modern weapons.
First campaign:
The initial British campaign was an attack on two fronts across a frontier of more than 1,500 km (930miles). In the eastern front, Major-General Bennet Marley and Major-General John Sullivan Wood led their respective columns across the Tarai towards the heart of the valley of Kathmandu. Further east, on the Sikkim border, Captain Latter led a small force in a primarily defensive role. Major-General Rollo Gillespie and Colonel David Ochterlony commanded the two columns in the western front. These columns were pitted against the cream of the Gorkha army under the command of Amar Singh Thapa. All four columns were composed mainly of Indian troops, though Ochterlony’s was the only column without a single British infantry battalion. The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Lord Moira.
The campaign started badly for the British. A day before the Governor-General officially declared war on 1 November 1814, General Gillespie had been killed trying to take the weakly-defended fort at Kalanga at the Battle of Nalapani. In the interval before Gillespie’s successor Major-General Gabriel Martindell took over command, Colonel Sebright Mawby managed to take Kalanga by cutting off its water supplies. Soon after Martindell arrived however, the British suffered further setbacks at the hands of Ranjur Singh Thapa(Amar Singh Thapa’s son), at the Battle of Jaithak. Martindell eventually reduced Jaithak to rubble with his guns but, even with vastly superior numbers, he failed to occupy it for fear of counter-attack.
Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, (1758–1825) by A. W. Devis. Ochterlony was reluctant to go to war, stating "[Going to war] appears to me the most Quixotic and the most impolitic measure we have ever attempted."
The generals in the east mirrored this pusillanimity, with both Wood and Marley reluctant to face the enemy. After two attempts to advance on Butwal, Wood, with superior numbers, feebly retreated and took up a defensive posture at Gorakhpur. His compatriot, Major-General Marley, whose 8,000 strong force was supposed to provide the main striking force on Kathmandu, showed even more timidity. After his advance posts at Samanpore and Persa were wiped out due to lack of support, he was reduced to abject inactivity and, on 10 February 1815, deserted, "unable to endure the irksomeness of his situation ... took the sudden and extraordinary resolution in leaving the camp".
The company’s hopes now rested on the abilities of Colonel Ochterlony’s force of around 10,000 troops. Unlike the other generals, Ochterlony showed determination, skill and an ability to adapt to the circumstances. Although there were no initial decisive encounters, Ochterlony slowly pushed Amar Singh’s army higher and higher into the mountains until, in April 1815, the Gorkha general had been forced back into his main fort at Malaun.
The ensuing Battle of Dionthal was decisive. Attempts by Amar Singh’s most able lieutenant, Bhakti Thapa, to dislodge the British from the Dionthal ridge overlooking the Malaun fort failed. Although Bhakti Thapa was killed in the action on 16 April, the fort held out for a while. However, when news arrived announcing that Almora had fallen to Colonel Jasper Nicolls’ 2,000 strong force of regular sepoys on 26 April, Amar Singh Thapa realized the hopelessness of the situation and, threatened by the British guns, surrendered. In recognition of their heroic defences of their respective forts of Malaun and Jaithak, Ochterlony allowed Amar Singh and his son Ranjur (who had joined him at Malaun) to return home with their arms and men. During the campaign Ochterlony was promoted to major general.
The initial British campaign was an attack on two fronts across a frontier of more than 1,500 km (930miles). In the eastern front, Major-General Bennet Marley and Major-General John Sullivan Wood led their respective columns across the Tarai towards the heart of the valley of Kathmandu. Further east, on the Sikkim border, Captain Latter led a small force in a primarily defensive role. Major-General Rollo Gillespie and Colonel David Ochterlony commanded the two columns in the western front. These columns were pitted against the cream of the Gorkha army under the command of Amar Singh Thapa. All four columns were composed mainly of Indian troops, though Ochterlony’s was the only column without a single British infantry battalion. The Commander-in-Chief of the British forces was Lord Moira.
The campaign started badly for the British. A day before the Governor-General officially declared war on 1 November 1814, General Gillespie had been killed trying to take the weakly-defended fort at Kalanga at the Battle of Nalapani. In the interval before Gillespie’s successor Major-General Gabriel Martindell took over command, Colonel Sebright Mawby managed to take Kalanga by cutting off its water supplies. Soon after Martindell arrived however, the British suffered further setbacks at the hands of Ranjur Singh Thapa(Amar Singh Thapa’s son), at the Battle of Jaithak. Martindell eventually reduced Jaithak to rubble with his guns but, even with vastly superior numbers, he failed to occupy it for fear of counter-attack.
Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, (1758–1825) by A. W. Devis. Ochterlony was reluctant to go to war, stating "[Going to war] appears to me the most Quixotic and the most impolitic measure we have ever attempted."
The generals in the east mirrored this pusillanimity, with both Wood and Marley reluctant to face the enemy. After two attempts to advance on Butwal, Wood, with superior numbers, feebly retreated and took up a defensive posture at Gorakhpur. His compatriot, Major-General Marley, whose 8,000 strong force was supposed to provide the main striking force on Kathmandu, showed even more timidity. After his advance posts at Samanpore and Persa were wiped out due to lack of support, he was reduced to abject inactivity and, on 10 February 1815, deserted, "unable to endure the irksomeness of his situation ... took the sudden and extraordinary resolution in leaving the camp".
The company’s hopes now rested on the abilities of Colonel Ochterlony’s force of around 10,000 troops. Unlike the other generals, Ochterlony showed determination, skill and an ability to adapt to the circumstances. Although there were no initial decisive encounters, Ochterlony slowly pushed Amar Singh’s army higher and higher into the mountains until, in April 1815, the Gorkha general had been forced back into his main fort at Malaun.
The ensuing Battle of Dionthal was decisive. Attempts by Amar Singh’s most able lieutenant, Bhakti Thapa, to dislodge the British from the Dionthal ridge overlooking the Malaun fort failed. Although Bhakti Thapa was killed in the action on 16 April, the fort held out for a while. However, when news arrived announcing that Almora had fallen to Colonel Jasper Nicolls’ 2,000 strong force of regular sepoys on 26 April, Amar Singh Thapa realized the hopelessness of the situation and, threatened by the British guns, surrendered. In recognition of their heroic defences of their respective forts of Malaun and Jaithak, Ochterlony allowed Amar Singh and his son Ranjur (who had joined him at Malaun) to return home with their arms and men. During the campaign Ochterlony was promoted to major general.
Second campaign:
After Ochterlony’s successful campaign, the Kathmandu durbar failed to ratify the peace agreement signed on 28 November 1815. This reticence to sign soon led to the second campaign. Unsurprisingly, Lord Moira placed Ochterlony in command of the 20,000 strong invasion force of Nepal.
While General Ochterlony advanced towards Makwanpur, simultaneous operations by the chogyal (king) of Sikkim drove the Nepalese army from the east. Amar Singh Thapa took no part in the campaign – he had retired to a temple, and died shortly after the war ended.
After the decisive Battle of Makwanpur on 28 February 1816 and the fall of the neighbouring fort of Hariharpur (after Ranjur Singh abandoned his post), the situation became very critical for Nepal. The British threat to the capital Kathmandu compelled the Nepalis to ratify the treaty without any further delay.
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